#1224 Dan Zahavi - Being We: Phenomenological Contributions to Social Ontology

00:00 Ricardo Lopes: Hello, everyone. Welcome to a new episode of the Dissenter. I'm your host, as always, Ricardo Lops, and today I'm joined by Doctor Dan Zahavi. He's a professor in the department of communication at the University of Copenhagen. And today we're talking about his book Being We Phenomenological Contributions to Social Ontology. So, Doctor Zahavi, welcome to the show. It's a big pleasure to

00:24 Dan Zahavi: everyone. It's my pleasure as well.

00:28 Ricardo Lopes: So let me first ask you, what is phenomenological sociology, which is basically the framework you apply in your book.

00:39 Dan Zahavi: Well, I guess, I guess one might give different answers. So I mean a historical answer would basically point back to the work of Alfred Schutz, who is often Recognized as the founder of homological sociology and so what he did in the In the early 30s was to try to solve specific problems that he thought could be found in the sociology of Bieber by using resources from Huso's phenomenology, especially Husso's theory of intentionality. So, so again, I think historically speaking, it was an attempt to basically engage with, with foundational problems in sociology but using again resources, tools, approaches that one finds in phmological uh uh philosophy. So that was, sorry, so that was, that was the kind of historical question, and I guess another more systematic, uh, way of answering it would be to say that that one of the characteristic features of femological sociology. IS basically to look at social reality through a focus on experiencing, acting, feeling agents. So it's very much a kind of a bottom up approach. We're trying to understand social phenomena. By looking at, you know, primarily human beings who are engaged in all kinds of different types of actions and relations, and this is not supposed to say that sociality and social reality does not also consist of Institutions, power structures, and so on and so forth, but the idea would still be that in order to understand the impact of again, institutions, nation states, nation states, uh. Hierarchical power structures, etc. I mean we still need to factor in the subjects who in all kinds of ways are Constrained and affected by by these structures. So again, the focus is very much on on subjects. Mhm.

03:02 Ricardo Lopes: Yes, and before we talk about we identities or what being we means from this perspective, let's go through some, uh, some concepts here that apply to individuals just for people to get also a better understanding of what your approach is about. So, first of all, from the perspective of phenomenology, what is individual subjectivity?

03:30 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, so I guess I mean 11 way of understanding it is basically to take one's point of departure and experience and so individual subjectivity is basically a reference to. The experiencing subject, I mean that's one very kind of easy way I guess to explain the term. One might also talk about one might emphasize the role of embodiment. I mean that's of course another classical phmological move. So talking about a An individual subject is also to talk about an embodied perspective on the world. It's a specific point of view on the world, so it's very much again focusing in on experience.

04:15 Ricardo Lopes: And what constitutes an I? I mean, what is the self exactly?

04:23 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, so, so, so this is of course a slightly tricky question because I think, I also think many feminologists would say that that we actually need to make distinctions here. So there are different. Dimensions, the different levels of selfhood, but if we start with what I would consider to be the most basic and most fundamental level, it again very much has to do with first personal subjectivity. So to speak of a self is not to speak of something that If you want, has an existence. Beyond or beneath or above our streams of consciousness, no selfhood, most fundamentally speaking, is really about experiential subjectivity. Again, it has to do with being a specific perspective on the world, a perspective that is not anonymous but precisely. Characterized by a fundamental subjectivity, so I think that is the most fundamental dimension of selfhood. And then one could talk of a number of other ones, and I'm sure we will return to some of them, but just perhaps to indicate one contrasting notion, I mean this would be an understanding of the self that is much more. Normatively embedded and where one's self-identity might somehow be connected to specific values, specific norms, specific professions, social roles, etc. AND of course to, I mean, in many, in many ways, I mean that's also very much what we take ourselves to be. And so if somebody were to ask me, well, who are you? I would probably not say I'm a subject of experience, even though that is correct, but it would not be a very informative question. What I would rather do would be to say something about my profession, interests, what concerns me in the world. I think that's another dimension of selfhood that is also, I think, very important and which will also be very important if we eventually are to start to talk about re-identity.

06:32 Ricardo Lopes: Right, but is the self experientially grounded and pre-reflectively present, or is it socially constructed and extended?

06:45 Dan Zahavi: Yes, well, so, so I mean, I think the answer to that question would, would come basically by just appealing to the two different notions of, of self that I just introduced. So, so I don't think you can have a yes-no answer. I mean, I think, I mean, my view would be it is both. It is both experientially embedded and pre-reflectively given. And that pertains to the self understood as basically the subjectivity of experience and on the other hand, it's also normatively constrained and extended and the notion of self where I think it makes sense to say. Those kinds of things are precisely this normatively loaded notion that I just introduced. So again, I think the self is a very complex and many faceted phenomenon, and we need different kind of conceptual frameworks in order to do justice to it.

07:44 Ricardo Lopes: Right, so before we get into, uh, the we identity, there's one more concept that is important to tackle here because we will get back to it later on in our conversation. What is collective intentionality?

08:01 Dan Zahavi: Yes, so, so, so I guess, I mean, uh, I mean, perhaps the easiest way to, to introduce this notion is by By taking one's point of departure on individual intentionality, what is the kind of default mode of intentionality, and of course in the philosophical literature intentionality. I mean it has a very, it has a very specific meaning. It's, it's not exclusively connected to voluntary action. I mean sometimes one talks about having intentions in the sense of now I want to do something. But in the philosophical literature, intentionality basically refers to the fact that consciousness is about something or consciousness is directed at something, so my perceptual states are intentional in the sense that they are directed at the table or the monitor or the street outside my window. So perception is intentional. I can have feelings that are intentional. I can love somebody. I can hate somebody. I can be afraid of somebody. I gain, all kinds of different intentional states, but all these examples, I mean, are basically individual types of individual intentionality where I am the one who is somehow. Engaged with an object or a topic of some kind, and the interesting point is then that we can also talk about collective intentionality where several people together are either doing something or making decisions together or having emotions together, emoting together. So the point is similar to, I mean, I mean, and this is of course one of the challenging things and one of the reasons why people have been. Thinking about collective intentionality, how do we move a notion that seems so embedded to the individual mind? I mean, to what extent can we apply that to a to a collective, I mean, I mean, do we need then to postulate the existence of some kind of group mind? I mean, is there something like that, or should we somehow understand? Well, the subject of the collective intentionality in a different way. But again, just to make, I mean, a very, again, very simple examples. I mean if, if, if the two of us are now having a conversation, I mean that would actually be something that involves a form of collective intentionality. If, if the two of us were to move a table together, we would be moving it together again. That would be a joint action, something we were doing together. So those, those would serve as examples of collective intentionality.

10:46 Ricardo Lopes: I understand. Yeah, and what is then we identity?

10:52 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, so, so, so I guess one of the things that I, um, that I'm trying to do in the book, and perhaps I should just say a little bit about, uh, at this point about the kind of move I'm making in the book because collective intentionality, I mean, as I just indicated, I mean it has been a topic that has been. Discussed extensively, especially in analytic philosophy for the last, say, 35, 40 years. What is interesting though is that it's actually not a new topic. It was also discussed in early phenomenology, for instance, by Schutz that we referred to a moment ago. And what I have been trying to do in the book is to some extent to also go back to some of these early discussions, discussions that more or less took place between the outset of World War I. Until the early 30s, so it's a period of about 20 years when a lot of philosophers coming out of this homological tradition were really engaging with problems also connected to collective intentionality. And one of the things that I think they are highlighting to a larger extent than much of the contemporary debate. It's precisely at this point that if we want to understand collective intentionality. We shouldn't merely look at how, say, the intentions of different individuals can somehow intertwine or merge to such an extent that they now constitute an instance of collective intentionality. That's important as well. But what we should also look at is precisely the question of self-identity, the question of to what extent. Our engagement in collective intentionality is both something that affects and influences our identity as selves and also something that might be enabled and facilitated by the identity we are having. So I'm kind of saying, you know, rather than just looking at the specific intentions, let's try to bring in this topic of identity as well. And that's where then the question of the we pops up because you know how do we articulate types of collective intentionality? Well, we usually do that by referring to the To the first person plural pronoun, I mean, we are saying we are having a conversation, we are moving a table together, we are making a decision. So there's this, this we that I think needs to be better understood, um. Um, YEAH, so, so, so, basically, I guess, I mean, one of the questions is when talking about a we identity, what, what exactly is a we? Is a we some kind of group mind of, of a somewhat mysterious nature, or should we understand the, the, the nature of this we differently? I mean this is, this is part of what I have been trying to, to do in the book.

14:08 Ricardo Lopes: Mhm. And so let's explore that a little bit more. What is then the relationship between plural and individual selfhood?

14:18 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, so, so again, I mean, um. I mean it's interesting that different disciplines might have different answers to that question. I mean, so there are, I mean, I mean, I think sociologists. Oh, it's always a bit dangerous to generalize. So let us say some sociologists and some cultural psychologists and some anthropologists. Might be tempted by the proposal that plural selfhood, we, the community has a kind of priority vis a vis individual selfhood or individual subjectivity. So there might be this idea that in order to be an individual, this is actually something that is enabled by A social environment of a very specific kind. So it's basically by being born into being socialized within being inculturated within a very specific community that we start to gain an identity as an individual. So, on, on, on this kind of approach, a priority would be given to rural selfhood. My view would be somewhat different because here I would again appeal to my previous distinction between different notions of self. And I would say there are some notions of self where I think it does make sense to say that the community has a certain priority. I mean, imagine thinking about. You know, I mean, my identity as a professional philosopher, my identity as a professor of philosophy, I mean that is something that matters to me. It's something I have. Both spend a lot of time achieving and it's a way for me to fulfill my life. So this is a very important part of my identity, but I don't think you could be a professional philosopher or a professor of philosophy. If you were, you know, socially isolated, I mean, these are clearly professions and and social roles that are embedded within and requires a very complex cultural, social background. So there are in some senses, I mean, in some senses and in some cases, I, I do think it makes sense to give a priority to some kind of community and we. But then I would also say there's another notion of self that I think is prior to and is itself a precondition for a community and a we, and that is the experiential notion that I was referring to earlier. I don't see any prospects for claiming that. Individual subjectivity understood as, you know, Experiential subjectivity. That that is somehow reliant on or based on the outcome of some kind of social construction. On the contrary, I think that sociality intersubjective relations, and also the emergence of a we perspective is something that requires a plurality of individual perspectives. So, so I mean, So, so responding to your question, what is the relationship between individual and plural selfhood? I mean it depends a little bit, but, but if you want, I mean if you want my take on where the story has to begin, I would say it has to begin with individual subjective experience, and then there will be a kind of a. There will be a process that that that will then through community through the we feedback to to the to the to the nature of self will allow and allow for richer and more complex forms of self that are then dependent upon a community and a we, but, but again which that has then other preconditions including individual experiential subjectivity.

18:40 Ricardo Lopes: And how about consciousness? Is it really a private phenomenon?

18:47 Dan Zahavi: Well, uh, so I, so I think, again, I mean, I don't think one can say yes and no here because I think, I, I think consciousness are many different things. I mean, I do think. I do think there is something. Um How to put it, I think we need to recognize the existence of what might be called epistemic asymmetry. Understood in the following sense when I'm living through experiences, I, I'm acquainted with those experiences in a way that differs from how observers. WOULD be acquainted with my experiences. So I mean again if I'm very depressed. I'm living through that in a different way that people who are around me might pick up on it, and if I'm hungry again, I will experience that in a different way than other people will do. So today's something special, something distinct about my own acquaintance with my ongoing experiences, and if you want to call that private, that's fine with me. What is then, however, important is not to reduce consciousness to that because I, I think, and, and I think this is really important if one is to also understand how something like. A shared perspective might emerge. I think it's very important not to somehow commit to the idea that consciousness is exclusively private, that consciousness is only accessible to the to the subject of. That present consciousness and completely hidden and opaque and invisible to everybody else because were that the situation we were finding ourselves in. I think the problem of other minds, I think the problem of sociality, the problem of engaging meaningfully with others would be much more difficult than they are in fact, and I think it would be very hard to make sense of something that I think is very important for the emergence of a wee perspective, and that is the presence of what I would call shared experiences, the fact that we can. I mean, I mean, to, to take another uh uh notion that is also, uh, you know, widely used the notion of joint attention, I mean that, that both of us, if we are, say, in, in, in a, in a, uh, I mean if we, if we are in the same physical environment. I mean we might pay attention to the same thing and we and through communicative eye gaze we might make it apparent to both of us that we are now paying attention to the same thing. All of this happened usually in a very fluid, unproblematic manner, and I mean I think the fact that we can communicate in this way. I mean it's a very important building block for for higher levels of, of, of joint or collective intentionality, and I think it would be very hard to make sense of these very Again, simple ways of interacting with each other if in fact we had been in the position that I was warning against, namely the position where consciousness is really exclusively a private phenomenon and completely hidden to everybody else. Yeah, so, and, and I'm sorry, and then the question of course is, well, what is it then that is visible to others? I mean, of course I was pointing out that there's, when I'm living through my experiences, there are I have a certain acquaintance with those experiences that is different from how others might. Access them, but I would, but I would precisely say, I mean, when, when we are interacting, I don't think that what you are primarily confronted with. It is a kind of meat machine, you know, that that discloses or manifests different contortion of muscles with no psychological meaning. I think that would be a very strange description of our conversation. Hopefully, I mean you are seeing me as somebody trying to express my thoughts and showing interest in your questions, etc. ETC. I think that's the natural way of of of of describing what is going on. So I would say that our experiences, our conscious life is exactly. Being expressed in bodily gestures, facial expressions, actions, and that all those things have psychological meaning. That is also a way for the mind to, to, to manifest itself, and that is a dimension that other people can pick up on.

23:54 Ricardo Lopes: Uh, ON the topic of intersubjectivity, how is it established? Is it via detached mind reading or what psychologists usually call theory of mind, or does it depend on normative relations and shared values?

24:14 Dan Zahavi: So I mean I, I, I know it's getting a little bit repetitive because here again I would say you know you can't give a yes no answer here because it's a subjectivity. Again it's complex and there are many different ways in which it can be established. So I think that the, the, I mean the, the correct answer to your question would, would, would basically be to say yes to all of the proposals. I mean. AND I don't think anybody ought to deny that of course sometimes we do employ mind reading, sometimes we do employ a theory of mind, sometimes we do engage in imaginative perspective taking. I think all of that is given, but I think the interesting question and I think one of the areas where The philological tradition that I'm kind of coming from has had something to add to the kind of standard way social cognition has been discussed in the literature is precisely to emphasize that in addition to all these. Other, you know, procedures, there's also a more basic, more foundational form of perceptually based embodied relations. So, so I think in addition, so, so again, I mean, you know, if If I, if I encounter somebody on the street who is crying, I mean, I don't think my first impulse would be to engage in imaginative perspective taking and trying to figure out what could possibly Cause me to be in a situation like that in order to figure out what the person might be living through, nor do I think I would in the first instance try to consult various textbooks in psychological theory. No, I would in a much more spontaneous way pick up on this distress of the person, and I think it's very important not to overlook. This whole embodied dimension to our intersubjective relations, and I also think, I mean, you know, looking from the perspective of developmental psychology. That that is, you know, as far as I can see, also the, the, the kind of entreprenetically first way of engaging socially for the infant, I mean something like theory of mind is only something that becomes. Available at a at a at a later stage in development.

26:54 Ricardo Lopes: And so what is then or how should we think about the relationship or the interplay between the I and the we? I mean, to what extent is the eye a condition of possibility for the we and to what extent does the we uh have an impact on the nature and structure of the eye?

27:16 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, so, so, so I, I think one way to, to approach that question, I mean, is, is basically again to think about what exactly do we mean by a we, and I, and I mean I, I used earlier the The phrase, it's it's the first person plural pronoun, and I think it's very important to kind of To keep both notions in mind that it's first person and that it's plural. So the plural part obviously suggests that there has to be a certain plurality, and I think that is one way of doing away. With the conception of a group mind, if the group mind is understood somehow as an expanded singular mind, I mean, again, so I don't think the right way to think about the we is to think of it as a bigger I. I think that we is very importantly and kind of constitutionally. Dependent on, dependent upon the presence of a plurality of perspectives, it, it's a specific kind of integration. A relation between I mean a plurality of diverse perspectives and referring back to that diversity of perspectives, I mean that's then where the first person point comes in because I think it's precisely a plurality of first person perspective. So in the absence of an eye, in the absence of first person subjectivity. I don't think it makes any sense to talk about a we, and, and I mean that will allow me also to make one other point because when talking about groups, I think it's very important to to understand that a we. It's a very specific type of group. I mean there might be groups where you can be a member, where your membership is basically something that can be assigned from without in the sense that, you know, whether or not you are a citizen of a specific country, I mean it might for instance be a A question of where you were born, it's not up to you. It's not your decision. So I mean, again, whether you count as a member of that national community or not is, is again something that is externally determined. Likewise, I mean, whether you are a member of, uh, I don't know, a certain social class or whether you A member of a specific, you know, health group. Again, it's not up to your decision. It's not up to, it's not, it doesn't depend upon whether you agree or not. It's, it's really based upon the presence of specific external properties. If you have those properties, then you are a member of the group. If you don't have, you're not. Those are all kinds of groups, I think we is something very, very different. Because I don't think you can be assigned membership of a we independently of your own perspective on it. I mean, I think this is also one of the reasons why we is a first person plural perspective. So, so being a member of a we is also something that involves your own identification with. The group in question, and if you do not identify with the group, well then you are not part of the we in question. So I think that Uh, again, I'm coming back to your question, is, is an I a precondition for, for we are not? I mean, my, my, my argument would definitely be yes. I mean, because, I mean, if you don't have. If you don't have a first person perspective to start with and if you do not engage in processes of identification with The other group members, I mean, you will not be a member of the we in, in question, um.

31:27 Ricardo Lopes: Mhm. Um, AND what does the fact that individuals can identify with the group and adopt a we perspective tell us about the nature of selfhood and self-identity?

31:41 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, so I mean that brings us again back to this earlier, uh, distinction between different types of, uh, of, uh, of, of self because As I said, there is a normative, I mean, on a certain normative understanding of the self. I mean our self identity is precisely connected to social roles, values, norms, and that's why. You would know something about who I am if I started telling you, you know, what political party I'm voting for, you know, what values I take to be absolutely crucial, etc. ETC. Uh, uh, AND, and the point then is, as I said, uh, in order to be part of a, we, I mean, you need that, you need to identify, and the question, of course, I mean one of the questions, well, what exactly are you identifying with. Are you identifying with the specific Other individuals who are members of the group and that I mean it might be that we will later have to also then distinguish different types of wes because there are different types, but normally I would say the identification with a we is not. You know, in many instances it's not. Connected to the specific individuals that make up the we, because if that were the case, Well then, the moment there were a change of members, I mean we would somehow no longer, I would change, and I mean I think for many of us, I mean that's not. The experience we are having, I mean, I might identify, ascertain. That does not entail that I'm identifying with all the other Danes that are currently in existence such that the moment one of them died, suddenly my identity is under, you know, is being challenged. So I think, I think a more reasonable claim would be that what I'm identifying with are precisely. Specific values, commitment, norms that I take to be relevant for my identity. So I think in order to understand how I can start to identify with authors who are sharing the same norms, commitments, values, history, cultural background, or whatever type of we we are talking about. In order to be able to do that, well, all of those elements, cultural background, history, social roles must be something that is also relevant for my own self identity, and I think the self that we are talking about here is not this more minimal experiential self. I mean, simply having or possessing a first person perspective because that's too, it's too formal. If, if that was all we were, I think it would be very hard. I mean to imagine or to understand how something like the kind of much more robust, you know, type of we can can emerge, whereas I think if we, if we allow. You know, for the existence of several different dimensions of self, and if we recognize that one of those dimensions precisely has to do again with value, rituals, traditions, well then we have some material that can also constitute the glue. That can then connect us with authors that likewise partake in those types of identities. So, so I mean that's roughly the way I would, I would understand the, the, the process. Mhm.

35:22 Ricardo Lopes: And how are collective intentionality and the we perspective related to social cognition and interpersonal understanding.

35:34 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, so, so, so again, I mean, uh, I mean, it's one thing to, to, you know, to, to, to look at the relationship between the I and we arguing, well, I mean, I cannot be. A member of a we, if I'm not an I and it needs, it needs identification with the group, I mean, all of that is fine, but of course we should not forget. The plural part of the we, I mean that a we is always more than just me. I mean a we is something that by necessity involves other participants as well. And in order to understand what it means for me to be a member of a we. We also need to look at my relationship to those other members, and I mean one of the interesting. Questions of course has to do with with the with the following point. Is it enough? I mean, is, is my identification with the we sufficient for me being a member of the we? Is it only up to, to myself? Or does it also require the recognition and acknowledgement and acceptance of of of other members, and I mean, I think typically we would say, well, I mean somehow the others need to be on board to some extent, at least with with my being part of the identity that they are also part of. So we need to look more closely at at also these interpersonal relations. And here again I think that there's a huge difference between how these questions were discussed. In classical phenomenology and how they have been discussed in more recent kind of literature because I mean what one can find. In people like Searl or Tumula, for instance, I mean, a clear acknowledgement of the fact that there has to be some kind of contact with or understanding of others in order for something like collective intentionality to be possible. But there's no further reflection on whether some form of social cognition, some form of interpersonal understanding might be more conducive. More enabling for collective intentionality than others, and here I think that the feminologists have something to offer precisely because they are distinguishing different types of social cognition and what they would then highlight. Is precisely the importance of this. Embodied Perceptually based resonance between people. I mean, so again, to give you, I mean a simple example, I mean if we are to do something together or if we are to enjoy something together that is share emotions. I think the possibility of doing that. WILL be much higher. I mean, if we actually have perceptual access to each other's expressive embodied. Emotions than if we are based in two separate rooms and have to employ either imaginative perspective taking or more detached theory of mind employment. I mean, when we are together, I mean there's a form of synchronization. A kind of intertwinement of our, I mean we can affect each other, we can't be affected by our emotional responses in a way that will just allow for a much more tightly woven perspective on, on a shared world than if we are kind of running separate imaginative routines or more detached forms of theorizing.

39:32 Ricardo Lopes: Uh, AND what are the types of social cognition that are conducive to the emergence of a we perspective? In the book, for example, you talk about the role played by empathy, second person engagement, imaginative perspective taking, and detachment, detached inferential mind reading. So, uh, uh, let's start perhaps with empathy. What is the role played by it?

40:00 Dan Zahavi: Yes, so, so again, I mean, empathy is a big, a big topic, and, and, and I mean, uh. People are often understanding very different things about under this label. So again, I have to make it clear that when I'm talking about empathy in the book and also in a moment. I'm talking about empathy as this term was used by the philological philosophers that I'm kind of drawing on, and for them empathy refers precisely to this kind of perceptually based embodied pick up of Uh, you know, conscious states as they are, uh. Uh, MANIFEST in our, in our bodily actions and, and expressions. So, so empathy is not about Coming to have the same kind of emotion as somebody else, it's not about imagining what it would be like for me to be in your shoes. It's not about that. It's really about, I mean, if you are upset and I'm seeing it in you, in the way you are expressing it facially, bodily, for the femiologists that would qualify as empathy. And given that that is how they talk about empathy. And given what I was just saying a moment ago, I mean, I think it's obvious why empathy is important. For the emergence of a kind of basic shared perspective because it's precise in situations where we can empathize with each other and especially in situations where there are forms of reciprocal empathy that is, it's not just me empathizing with you, it's not just me picking up on the emotions you are currently expressing. But you at the same time are doing that vis a vis me. It's, it's exactly in such constellations. That again say our emotional life will then be able to You know, intertwine and allow for a form of co-constituted emotion.

42:09 Ricardo Lopes: Mhm. And what about second person engagement? What is the role played by that?

42:17 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, so, so, so, so that's something we haven't talked about, uh, yet, and, and, and that is also something that I devote quite a lot of time to in, in the book. So, so again, I mean, if, you know, second person engagement, what, what does that mean? I, I think the most, uh, easy way to explain it is to, to, to think of it. As the kind of attitude you have when you relate to somebody as a you, and so again, the, the, the standard idea would be, well, I mean, I can think about or relate to somebody as a he or she. That would be from a third person perspective, but I can also relate to somebody as a you. And when thinking that true, I mean, my conclusion was, and I'm certainly not the only one to say that. My conclusion was that what is very specific about a you relationship is that it has to be reciprocal. I mean, I can relate to somebody as a he or she even if they have absolutely no awareness of my current attention to them, but to relate to somebody as a you is precisely to relate to and address somebody who is reciprocating and who is in turn taking me as. Hers or his is you. So there's something intrinsically reciprocal about second personal engagement, and I think that also suggests why it might be particularly important for the emergence of a shared we perspective. I mean, it's really, it's a, it's a kind of an attitude that I cannot have on my own. I can only adopt a you perspective. On you if you kind of play along and the fact that both of us have to be active again suggests that that we are kind of moving into position to then be able to in, in the best of circumstances to, to do something together, to share perspective uh together.

44:21 Ricardo Lopes: Mhm. And what about the role played by imaginative perspective taking.

44:27 Dan Zahavi: Yes, I mean, I, I, I mean, I mean one of the problems with imaginative perspective taking is that that is something I can do on my own, and, and I mean, coming back to the question about whether one can become a member of a we. Unilaterally, I mean, can I myself decide that I that I'm now a member of a we? I mean, I find that a bit suspicious. I mean, I think it does require to some extent the acceptance of the authors. And of course, I mean there are all kinds of complications because if it's a very large, we again, you know, the, the national community of Danes, for instance, what are we supposed to understand by saying that my Identification as a day requires the author's acceptance. I mean, am I supposed to go around and ask everybody else whether they accept me or not? I mean, there's something of course very artificial about that proposal, but But uh, but, but I think it would be a problem if they denied me. I mean, if they would not recognize me, and then it would be difficult for me to uphold. That kind of we identity or my membership of that we identity. So, so again, I mean, I think the problem with, with imaginative perspective taking is I think it can help. To elaborate or cash out, uh, you know, what, what we understand under the we identity in question, and I mean one of the arguments, of course, in the nationalism literature is that when it comes to very large communities, very large, uh, we, I mean imagination is somehow crucial. Because the we in question will always involve people that I've never met in person. So, so it's a we that is not just based on actual encounters. So imagination seems to somehow play a role, but I think it, I mean, I guess what I would be a bit Uh, worried about would be the proposal that imagination on its own without being supported by other forms of interpersonal understanding could somehow, you know, uh, do, do the work. I, I, I don't think that would be, be possible.

46:54 Ricardo Lopes: Mhm. And finally, when it comes to the emergence of a we perspective, what is the role played by detached, inferential mind reading?

47:04 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, but I, but I, I mean, I think much of what I, what I said about imaginative perspective taking, I think would, would, would, uh, would hold for, for detached mind reading, uh, as well. I mean, because, because again, the point is that that is a cognitive process. That I can undertake on my own and you can do it and I mean we can do it each independently and I mean that just seems to be a very different process. Then say the second personal engagement really involves the contribution of participation of both parties. So again I would say I mean social or interpersonal understanding comes in many different. Forms and I think you know our social life is so rich that we also need to draw on many different kind of means of of of of kind of you know weaving us together, but But I, but I really would want to give a certain priority. To the kind of perceptually based. A relationship that that allows also for immediate feedback, confirmation, or rejection. I mean, it's in those situations where I think the most fundamental forms of a we can can emerge.

48:37 Ricardo Lopes: And are there varieties of we with whom can we constitute a

48:43 Dan Zahavi: we? Yes, so I think that is of course also very important. I mean, I've only kind of alluded to it a little bit in the past, but I mean, you know, descriptively speaking, I mean, it's very easy to To vary the dimensions along different kind of trajectories. So I mean we can speak of Vs of different sizes. There can be small wes and large wes. We can speak of. Um, DIFFERENCES in, say, temporal duration, I mean they can be very short lived, they can be very long lived. I mean, so on the one hand, I mean it might be a dyadic weed that is. Established in the here and now of a communication, I mean that's, that's one type of a we, uh, uh, another type of a we again would be, say, a transgenerational we, a we that somehow endures over generations, could, could again be exemplified by, you know, a family or a national community. And I mean it's, so I mean we are using the term we. In these different situations, but it's clear that that how they are established, I have very different explanations because I mean again there's a huge difference between, you know, again a dyadic we consisting of two people who are directly interacting and say my Relationship to again I keep speaking about the Danes, so let's just stick to that example. I mean Danes that are long dead and that I somehow identify with. Which for instance could then come to, to, uh, it could be expressed as when I was saying that we, we the Danes were horrified when the Germans invaded the country in 1940, for instance. I mean, so what, what, what kind of we is that and it's clearly a different kind than a dyadic one.

50:50 Ricardo Lopes: But do you think there are limits to the dimension of the collective with whom we can be part of what we?

51:00 Dan Zahavi: I, I mean, I, I, I, I, I, I guess it depends a little bit on what you mean. I mean, because, uh, so, so what I have, I have spoken so far on kind of small scale. Wes, I mean, and those include not just dyadic wes, triadic wes could also be small neighborhoods. I mean, so where people are knowing each other in person, I mean that's at least one kind of standard case. Then there are much larger wes. I mean it could be the organization. I mean, I think the University of Copenhagen, I mean if you count the students and all the employees, it's perhaps 50,000 people. Obviously I don't know all of them. I'm still, I mean I can still talk of the we also when referring to the University of Copenhagen and all my colleagues. We can talk about a national community as even larger, but of course also transnational communities. I mean, you know, religions are an obvious case in point. Uh, I mean, religions, I mean, yeah, world religions are not restricted to a national community. It could be social movements. It could be, you know. Climate crisis, activists, perhaps one could even speak of a global community. I mean, is there a we of All humans, I mean, I, I, I, I mean. I would, I would not rule that out. I mean, I mean one interesting question could be what could motivate us to start to think. Uh, LIKE that, and I mean, I think that raises an interesting question. I mean, the, the, the kind of example I often appeal to when, when, when discussing this is this. Uh, THIS American blockbuster movie, I think it was called Independence Day, I think it's basically about, you know, the earth suddenly being threatened by very hostile extraterrestrials and suddenly all the Countries that were in conflict on on Earth unite to fight off the alien invaders and and and that of course and the argument would be now suddenly you know there's a kind of a global human community and what I think the example illustrates is this question of To what extent we need outsiders, to what extent there needs to be a demarcation in order for a we to take form. And my view would be that I don't think it's always necessary. I think there are instances of types of wes that would not require. The demarcation, but I, but I, but I also think that the demarcation can Can transform and consolidate the we in question, and I, and I mean, you know, again, if we are to, if, if we are to start to think about. All of us as part of global humanity. I mean, I'm not sure that the most realistic and regrettably, but I'm not sure that, you know, ethical concerns or moral principles is what will Allow for that. Perhaps it will more be either an external threat. Or perhaps you know the threat of of of planetary disaster and climate crisis that suddenly makes us somehow realize that we need to overcome our internal division if we are to solve the problem. So, so, so, yeah, so, so, so coming back to your question, I mean, is there a limit? Because of course you could also say now I introduced the extraterrestrials. Well, what about them? I mean, could we in principle constitute a we with them as well? I mean, could there be a we of all conscious sentient creatures? In the universe I mean, I'm not ruling it out, uh, but, but I mean, I, but I, but I just think that are different, you know, there are different questions. I mean how. How would that identity ever be more than a mere idea? I mean, could it ever be fleshed out with content? I mean, I guess that would be one concern, uh, so the, so the more abstract or the more. The larger the we becomes, I mean that I guess there might be a certain danger of it simultaneously also being emptied of of meaning. That could be one problem or question. The other question would be, this issue of motivation. I mean, what is it that would motivate us suddenly to make this global identification? I mean, I, and I don't, I don't have, you know, some very thought out answers to those questions.

55:57 Ricardo Lopes: Mhm. So I have one last question then, uh, because we were talking also about, uh, different kinds of we, there are two other different kinds that I would like to ask you about. I mean, what is the relationship between the thin we of those who jointly establish the shared goal of solving a task, act accordingly, and then disperse when the goal is realized. And the thick we of group members who are committed to a shared ethos.

56:30 Dan Zahavi: Yeah, no, no, yeah, I mean, uh, I mean it also dawned on me that when I was, um, When I was saying that that you know we can differ along different kind of dimensions and mentioning, you know, the issue of size and the issue of duration, I mean there's obviously also another dimension that can be. Buried and that has to do with the strength, I mean the strength of, of, of the connection and and I and I do think that I mean there are And again, the thin thick is supposed to target this difference. There are types of wes that are very, if you will, strategically motivated. So it's about us now joining forces to accomplish a specific goal. And we might do that perhaps because it serves our own. You know, interest, so I'm prepared to kind of join in with you. Simply because it would also, uh, you know, maximize my chances of realizing my own independent goals and so we, we act as a kind of a thin, thin we and the moment we have achieved what we set out to, to do. We dissolve, I mean, again, thin, thin we, but of course there are thicker we's, I mean thicker we's that that that are not just motivated by us pursuing our individual goals, but that have common goals. I mean where the goals are really something we also decide upon jointly and where also our our participation. And identification can withstand struggle and setbacks. I mean, so it's not as if the moment. The moment our collaboration runs into obstacles, we would then say, OK, now it's too costly. I'm kind of leaving. No, I mean, because it's, it's, it's much more important to us. It's much more important to our self-conception, our, our way of life. That we partake in the we in question, and so I think that Let me just to add one more thing that that in order to understand how something like These more robust forms that we can emerge. I mean, I also think we need to look beyond. Simply, you know, again face to face interaction and and and kind of bodily resonance, I mean to these more robust forms of We typically also involve inculturation, shared social norms, traditions. It's something also about your upbringing. I mean there's a whole history of again. Community building behind them, so it's a much more complicated, complex, normative hierarchical structure and uh and again, so perhaps one can say well you know that's the the most complicated case and and and the the here and now. Of the diet, I mean, is the, is the most minimal case and so there's a huge variety of different cases that are that are proper exhaustive discussion of of the we would also have to take into consideration. It was a pleasure talking with you. And let it, let that be the end of it.

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